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THE FAILURE OF ATTACKS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM
Earl M Maltz*
In assessing the importance of any particular theory to a field
of study, one might well use a combination of two techniques. T:.~
most obvious technique would be to count the number of adherents
which the theory commands and assess their prominence. As more
scholars-particularly well-known scholars-profess allegiance to a
given mode of analysis, it perforce assumes greater importance. In
addition, however, one might focus on the frequency and vehemence with which the relevant theory is attacked. Typically critics
simply ignore those opposing positions that they consider trivial.
Thus the mere fact that opponents often take the time to attempt to
refute a position is important evidence of its significance.
One's evaluation of originalism-the theory that in constitutional adjudication judges should be bound by the intent of the
framersi-will vary greatly depending upon which of these techniques one employs. Only a very small minority of constitutional
theorists claim to be originalists.2 Taken alone, this might suggest
that originalism is only a minor theme in the overall development of
constitutional theory. But if an observer focuses on the frequency
and vehemence with which the approach is criticized, originalism
emerges as one of the most important constitutional theories. For
the proposition that judges should adhere to the intent of the framers generates unceasing, often vitriolic attacks from those who advocate other modes of constitutional analysis. Indeed, virtually
every nonoriginalist theorist begins his analysis with an extensive
discussion of the perceived flaws in the originalist approach.
How does one explain the pervasive fear of the looming specter
of originalism? It may very well reflect at least an implicit under* Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Rudy Peritz.
I. The term "originalism" is Paul Brest's. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). Others refer to the same theory as
"interpretivism." See, e.g.,]. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 702 (1975).
2. See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373. 378 (1982) (originalism is
"increasingly without defenders, at least in the academic community").
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standing that the justifications for originalist theory are far more
powerful than those which are normally put forth. For far from
being based on a simplistic appeal to the concept of democracy (the
most common refuge of originalist theorists)3 originalism rests on a
variety of complex basic premises. These premises reflect fundamental conceptions of the nature of the judicial process and the
proper allocation of authority between the courts and other
branches of government. 4 These conceptions are rarely if ever fully
and clearly articulated; further, their correctness cannot be rigorously demonstrated. Nonetheless the concepts embodied in originalism rather plainly reflect views on the nature of judging which
have a strong intuitive appeal to many Americans.
The strength of this appeal is reflected in the structure of judicial opinions. Even results which are patently inconsistent with
originalism are often couched in rhetoric about the intent of the
framers. Moreover, one cannot read a broad range of constitutional
cases without reaching the conclusion that originalism has in fact
been an important influence on the development of constitutional
doctrine (although admittedly not the only influence). Thus in order to forego originalist analysis one must also be willing to abandon a major part of the American judicial tradition.
It is against this background that the attacks on originalism
must be evaluated. Basically, these attacks can be divided into two
categories, "comparative" and "absolute." Comparative arguments
evaluate the putative results generated by originalism with those
which would be produced by some alternative mode of constitutional analysis. Such arguments typically conclude that since the
alternative mode would generate better results, originalism should
be abandoned.s Absolute arguments, by contrast, do not depend on
demonstrating the superiority of some specific alternative; instead,
focusing only on the originalist position itself, these arguments conclude that the basic structure of that position is inherently flawed.
I have argued elsewhere that in making their comparative arguments, nonoriginalists have both overstated the advantages of alternative approaches and understated the costs associated with such
3. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. I. 2-4 (1971); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 371-72
(1981): Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 6<l3, 704-06 (1976).
4. See Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the In lent of the
Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811, 831-36 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Maltz, New Thoughts]; Maltz. The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. <l<l5,
997-1000 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Maltz, Dark Side].
5. For classic examples of comparative argument, see M. PERRY, THE CONSTITU·
TIOI', THE COURTS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Grey. supra note I. at 710-14.
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approaches.6 In any event, comparative arguments are by their nature inconclusive. First, both originalist and nonoriginalist positions typically rest on controversial fundamental premises regarding
the appropriate nature of the basic structure of government. For
example, while originalists typically argue that aggressive judicial
review is difficult to reconcile with the concept of democracy, nonoriginalists often contend that an activist judiciary is vital to
American democracy. 7 Stripped of the reference to the emotionally-charged term "democracy," in essence the originalists are arguing that a pure majoritarian system is intrinsically superior, while
the nonoriginalists are rejecting the pure majoritarian ethic.
Neither premise is susceptible to objective proof; one can adopt
either without fear of conclusive refutation.
A second problem with comparative arguments is that they
often rest on unprovable assumptions about the tangible effects of
the adoption of a particular nonoriginalist approach. In this respect
discussions of Dean John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcement
analysis are typical. Ely himself would limit fundamental rights to
those that help to purify the democratic political process.s By contrast, others have argued that Ely's representation-reinforcement
approach necessarily implies that other rights should also be given
special judicial solicitude; among those most often proposed are a
right to welfare and a right to a public education.9 To some, the
choice between Ely's approach and originalism might turn on the
resolution of this controversy.
The result of these uncertainties is that in purely comparative
terms neither originalists nor nonoriginalists can ultimately win the
argument over judicial review. Instead, resolution of the political
debate will turn on the question of which side has the burden of
proof. Perhaps because of these difficulties, in recent years
nonoriginalists have increasingly turned to absolute arguments in
their attempts to incontrovertibly discredit originalism. The absolute attacks generally take one of three forms. Linguistic arguments
claim that the originalist position does not adequately specify the
methodology which judges are to follow in constitutional cases.
Certainty-based arguments, by contrast, posit a definite originalist
6. See Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 4; Maltz, Dark Side, id.
7. Compare sources cited note I supra with, e.g., Simon, The Authority of the Framers
of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1482
(1985). For an evaluation of the originalist argument on this point, seen. 4 and accompanying text, infra.
8. See 1. ELY, supra note I, at 73-104.
9. See, e.g., San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 41 I U.S. I, 62-63 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Michelman. Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 659.
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structure but contend that the results generated by that structure
are so uncertain as to be intolerable. Finally, some argue that no
defensible political or moral theory supports originalism.
In much the same way in which they deal with comparative
arguments, originalists typically respond to absolute arguments in
terms which are equally absolute. With respect to important issues,
they argue that the historical evidence is perfectly clear and incontrovertible.Io Further, they often contend that the originalist mode
of interpretation is the only methodology consistent with a coherent
"objective" concept of law'' or with democratic theory.12 Thus
originalists conclude that originalism is the only methodology that
provides a principled mode of constitutional interpretation.
Phrased in such stark terms, the originalist arguments are quite
weak. Rather plainly, the historical evidence is uncertain on some
points.n Further, one need only consult the nonoriginalist literature itself to discover carefully wrought theories of law which do
not proceed from originalist premises. Finally, originalist theory itself creates tensions with even the most simplistic concept of
democracy.I4
The weakness of the standard formulations of the originalist
arguments makes the absolutist contentions seem stronger than
they actually are. For to refute the absolutist counterarguments,
one need not demonstrate that originalism is the only conceivable
approach to constitutional adjudication. It suffices to show that references to the framers' intent may be tenable.
THE LINGUISTIC ARGUMENT
To understand the linguistic argument, one must first focus on
the structure of the originalist position. In its simplest terms, that
position may be stated as follows: "In constitutional adjudication,
the duty of the court is to interpret the constitutional text. The
proper mode of interpreting a legal text is to determine the intent of
the drafter or drafters of that text and to apply that intent to the
case before the court. Therefore, in constitutional cases the court
should apply the intent of the framers." The originalist position
See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
See, e.g., id. at 283-300; Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a
Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. I, 18-20 (1981).
12. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 3, at 2-4; Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 702-04.
13. For example, on the issue of whether the framers of the fourteenth amendment
intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, compare R. BERGER. supra note
10, at 134-47 with Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CoNN. L.
REV. 237 (1982).
14. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
10.
II.
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plainly rests on two premises: first, that the proper function of the
Court is to interpret the Constitution and second, that the proper
mode of interpretation is determination of the intent of the framers.
Even nonoriginalists typically accept the premise that the role
of courts is to interpret the Constitution. Is They attack the remainder of the originalist argument with a number of linguistic contentions. Some nonoriginalists say that interpretation does not
necessarily imply inquiry into the intent of the framers; they note,
for example, that literary critics and philosophers quite often view
the interpretation of language as a process entirely independent of
the determination of the intent of the author of the relevant
words.I6 More commonly, nonoriginalists tum their linguistic analysis on the concept of the "intent of the framers." First, they note
that even where a document has a single drafter, the use of particular words may reflect a variety of intentions, each of which may be
defined quite narrowly or broadly.11 In addition, nonoriginalists
rely heavily on the fact that constitutions are the product of many
institutions and many drafters, each of whom may have a different
intent. Is
The common thread which connects the various linguistic arguments is the perception of the indeterminacy of the originalist
position. Focusing on the variety of meanings which can be given
to both interpretation and intent, nonoriginalist linguistic analysts
contend that one of two conclusions is inevitable: either originalism
is inherently incapable of providing a meaningful standard to guide
judges, or almost any mode of constitutional adjudication can appropriately be viewed as fitting within the originalist formulation.
Thus the linguistic analysts argue that the search for "the" intent of
the framers is inevitably a fruitless task. They conclude that therefore some nonoriginalist theory of constitutional adjudication must
be adopted.
In analyzing nonoriginalist linguistic arguments, one must first
recognize the broad scope of the contentions which the arguments
15. See, e.g., Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 489
(1985); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985).
16. For a good sampling of the nonoriginalist arguments on this point, see two recent
symposia devoted entirely to discussions of the concept of interpretation in judicial reasoning.
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1-725 (1985); 60 TEX. L. REV. 373-586 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 469,483-97 (1981);
Munzer & Nickel, Does The Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?. 77 CoL. L. REV.
1029, 1030-32 (1977); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism
and Neutral Principles. 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 798-99 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 459-60
(1984); Brest, supra note I, at 212-13; Dworkin, supra note 17, at 482-84, 487-88; Levinson,
supra note 2, at 379.
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are said to support. Certainly one can agree that terms such as "interpretation" and "intent of the framers" can be defined in a variety
of ways. But one still must choose among the various potential
meanings; and since the meaning chosen serves to define the proper
function of the courts-part of the government-such a choice is
most plausibly based on political considerations.I9 Thus if the only
point of linguistic arguments is to demonstrate the possibility of alternative definitions, such arguments merely lead us back to the
political and moral critiques of the originalist position; independently, the linguistic approach does not add significantly to the
strength of the nonoriginalist position.
In order to be independently significant, linguistic arguments
must go further and demonstrate either that originalists assign no
particular meaning to the relevant terms or that adoption of the
meanings assigned would not significantly constrain the courts.
The linguistic attack on the originalist conception of "interpretation" satisfies neither of these criteria. The originalist does not argue that reference to the intent of the framers is the only possible
definition of interpretation; only that the proper role of the courts is
interpretation and that by interpretation she means reference to the
framers' intent. Thus in the originalist lexicon use of the term interpretation becomes simply a method for referring to the duty of the
courts to act in accord with the intent of the framers. In linguistic
terms, the argument therefore turns on an evaluation of the
originalist use of the latter concept.
On their face, the nonoriginalist arguments that focus directly
on the language of the intent term seem quite plausible. Unlike the
concept of interpretation, the originalist formulation contains no direct referent for the intent term. There is no apparent barrier to
adopting any of a number of plausible concepts of intent-either in
terms of the breadth of the intent to be analyzed or the identity of
the persons whose intent is deemed important. If one concept of
intent is as good as another, the originalist position crumbles.
Is the concept of intent, as used by originalists, hopelessly indeterminate? To answer this question, let us begin by distinguishing
carefully between the content of an idea and the language used to
describe that idea. A person begins by developing a concept in his
mind. At some stage he decides to attempt to communicate that
concept to others. At that point the relevant concept may be fully
formed and specific or underdeveloped and vague. But in any
event, the communicator must choose the language which he believes will best express his idea.
19.

See Richards, supra note IS. at 499.
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Even assuming that he has developed the relevant concept with
great precision, he may face a variety of problems in this process.
First, if the idea is to be disseminated widely, the communicator
must recognize that people may differ widely in their understanding
of the meaning of particular words. Thus, he must remember that
his own understanding of the meaning of a word is not dispositive;
instead, he must employ language which will effectively convey his
meaning to others. Further, even if he chooses his mode of expression with great care, some are likely to misunderstand the message.
The use of terms such as "democracy" and "democratic theory" in the debate over judicial review illustrates this point. Virtually all participants in the debate agree that an appeal to democratic
theory connotes a general belief in the principle of political equality.
At times, however, democracy is defined to embrace additional values as well. For example, some suggest "true" democracy requires
a certain measure of equality in the distribution of wealth.zo The
result is that when one refers to an idea as grounded in democratic
theory, different listeners may attach different implications to that
reference.
The mere fact that an idea may be expressed imperfectly or
ambiguously does not, however, suggest that the communicator has
not developed a fully-formed, concrete theory. For example, when
Dean Ely refers to the concept of democracy, he is basically concerned only with equal access to the political process; by contrast,
Professor Richard Parker includes economic equality within his
definition of democracy. In each case the content of the relevant
concept itself is relatively clear; it is only the language used to convey the concept which is ambiguous.
The linguistic attacks on originalist theory are vulnerable to a
similar analysis. Admittedly, on its face the intent term is subject to
diverse interpretations. Yet originalists themselves clearly intend
the term to convey a fairly precisely defined concept of the proper
functioning of the judicial process. This concept embodies both a
specific definition of intent and an established hierarchy among the
intents of those who participated in the drafting process.
Originalists clearly define intent narrowly rather than broadly.
The term refers to the contemporaneously expected impact of relevant provisions instead of the general motivations of those involved
in the drafting. While the hierarchy of drafters is discussed less
often, a number of principles emerge from the literature. With respect to section one of the fourteenth amendment, for example, dis20. See. e.g.. Parker. The Past of Constitutional 71leory-And Its Future, 42
L.J. 223 (1981 ).
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cussions of the intentions of Congress rather than of the ratifying
states predominate. Within Congress, the most important opinions
are generally perceived to be those of John Bingham, the drafter of
the specific language, and Thaddeus Stevens and Jacob Howard,
who made the official presentations of the views of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which developed the fourteenth amendment. The views of Republican supporters in the 39th Congress
typically are also accorded significant weight. Other evidence is
largely tangential.
Nonoriginalist linguistic analysts therefore do not show that
the basic concept of originalism itself cannot give effective guidance
to judges in constitutional adjudication; at most nonoriginalists can
contend that the intent term generally used to describe the concept
is insufficiently specific. This hardly seems a telling criticism of the
basic theory. If insufficient specificity is the problem, the solution is
to make the language more specific rather than to abandon originalism entirely.
Moreover, an attack on the specificity of the intent term would
be overstated in any event. The use of the term is a clear reference
to the intent of the legislature. In that context the courts have developed a relatively clear set of conventions which largely resolve
any ambiguities generated by the use of the concept of intent. The
same conventions can be easily adapted to the resolution of similar
problems encountered in the constitutional context.
Indeed, when it suits their purposes nonoriginalists themselves
have little difficulty in giving content to the intent term. One of the
major political arguments against originalist theory is that its
adoption would force the courts to abandon "good" decisions such
as Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold v. Connecticut.2 1
Nonoriginalists could hardly make such an assertion if they did not
have a clear understanding of what the use of the intent term
entails.
THE ARGUMENT FROM UNCERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo that the intent term can be viewed as a
single, well-defined, concrete entity, nonoriginalists often base part
of their attack on the difficulty of ascertaining historical "facts"
such as the intent of the framers. Typically the arguments focus on
such factors as the necessary incompleteness of the evidence and the
difficulty of placing oneself within the world view of those who lived
21. See. e.g., M.
ST. L.J. 143 (1981).

PERRY,

supra note 5, at 1-2: Gerety, Doing Without Privacy, 42

OHIO
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one or two centuries ago. The uncertainty generated by these factors is viewed as a fatal flaw in the originalist argument.22
Nonoriginalists are correct in asserting that one can rarely determine the actual intent of the framers with absolute certainty.
The key question is whether such uncertainty should be viewed as a
dispositive objection to originalism. On this point two different
types of argument might be made.
First one might argue that certainty of result is the most
important attribute of any system of judicial review.23 By this
criterion, the important question is not whether the results which
would be generated by the adoption of a particular theory are uncertain. Instead the key issue is whether the degree of uncertainty
inherent in the application of the challenged theory is greater than
that of competing approaches.
Measured against this standard, the originalist approach fares
quite well. The intent of the framers is no more difficult to ascertain
than conventional morality,24 the requirement of representation-reinforcement analysis,2s or the decision that will best advance the
cause of socialism.26 In a comparative perspective, the argument
from the need for certainty is not fatal to originalist theory.
More commonly, nonoriginalists argue that original ism specifically requires that clear, noncontroversial answers be derivable
from a search for the intent of the framers.27 This contention, however, misapprehends the essential nature of originalism. Obviously
certainty is a value which enhances the appeal of any legal theory.
Originalist theory, however, is primarily concerned with addressing
far more fundamental concerns. It is not the results generated by
reference to the intent of the framers-clear or unclear, concrete or
vague-which provide the core of originalism's appeal. Instead, the
appeal derives from a particular conception of law, which in turn
requires the use of a specific judicial reasoning process. The process
22. See, e.g., Brest, supra note I, at 218-22; Tushnet, supra note 17, at 796-804.
This argument should be distinguished carefully from that which holds that the intent of
the framers can be determined definitively, and that the requisite intent was to create an
"open-ended" constitutional order. See, e.g., 1. ELY, supra note I, at 11-41; Sedler, The
Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective,
44 OHIO ST. L.1. 93, 126-37 (1983). Cf Bryden, Politics. the Constitution, and the New Formalism, 3 CONST. COMM. 415, 427 (1986).
23. See Brest, supra note I, at 222 (by implication).
24. E.g., Perry, Abortion. The Public Morals and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976); Wellington, Common Law
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.1. 221
(1973).
25. 1. ELY. :>upra notes I & 8 and accompanying text.
26. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 43 OHIO ST. L.1. 411 (1981).
27. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 793.
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does not require judges to perform the impossible task of divorcing
themselves from the political, historical, and cultural context in
which they function; instead, all that is required is that judges apply
the conventions inherent in originalist theory to make their best estimate of the "framers' intent."
POLITICAL AND MORAL THEORY
Of course, the concept of law embodied by originalism is itself
a manifestation of a particular political or moral worldview. If one
could prove that this worldview is totally indefensible, then the argument for originalism would also be refuted.
The nonoriginalist argument based on political and moral theory begins with the assumption that any defensible approach to constitutional adjudication must be derivable from some coherent
political or moral theory. Nonoriginalists argue that it is impossible
to construct such a theory which supports a requirement that the
courts be bound by the intent of the framers.2s In taking this position, they focus primarily on the two arguments upon which
originalists themselves rely most heavily: the appeal to democratic
theory29 and the appeal to the concept of law itself.3o
Although it is probably the most popular defense of originalism, the appeal to democratic theory is also the easiest to dismiss.
The Constitution itself plainly establishes rights which are inconsistent with the basic concept of majoritarian rule. The existence of
these rights cannot be reconciled with "democracy" by pointing out
that the Constitution itself was adopted through a democratic process; clearly, the principle of majority rule must refer to contemporary majorities, not those which existed in 1787.31 Thus, the appeal
to democratic theory is best understood as "a conceptually muddled
groping for judicial restraint."32
Moreover, in some circumstances democratic theory would
support nonoriginalist activism. For example, the framers plainly
intended that the states retain a large measure of autonomy in determining the structure of their respective governments. Accordingly, from an originalist perspective the reapportionment cases
probably were wrongly decided.33 But from the standpoint of dem28. E.g., Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL L.
REV. 647 (1985); Simon, supra note 7.
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note I, at 1·9; Bennett, supra note 28, at 648.
30. See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 474-75; Simon, supra note 7.
31. See Maltz, New Thoughts, supra note 4, at 821-22; Sager, Rights Skepticism and
Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 417, 443-45 (1981).
32. Bennett, supra note 28, at 648.
33. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 69-98; Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as
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ocratic theory "one person, one vote" is preferable to the framers'
intentions. In this context, originalist theory thus leads to a (good
or bad) antidemocratic result.
The originalist position is not grounded on democracy. It is
grounded on the concept of law. On this point Professor Ronald
Dworkin aptly summarizes the essence of the nonoriginalist attack:
"[n]one of the standing philosophical theories of law supplies the
necessary arguments [to justify the adoption of originalism]."34 Obviously, even if correct this statement alone does not discredit
originalism; if originalism can be viewed as a product of some coherent theory of law, it matters little that the theory is different
from that espoused by (for example) Bentham, Austin, Kelsen or
Hart. Nonoriginalists, however, go further, arguing that it is impossible to construct the necessary philosophical theory.35 And so,
they conclude, originalism must be abandoned.
In order properly to evaluate this claim, one must first focus on
the nature and limits of the concept of philosophical proof itself.
Philosophers sometimes analogize their approach to the scientific
method. But the two disciplines differ in at least one important respect. The ultimate test of any scientific theory is the extent to
which the model generated by the theory coincides with observable
physical reality; if proven inconsistent with that reality, any theory-no matter how elegant-must be abandoned or modified.
Moral and political philosophers, by contrast, have no tangible
baseline against which to measure their normative theories. The
question of whether an approach is valid or not is determined solely
by reference to a group of abstract rules which establish guidelines
by which various attempts at "proof" are evaluated. Typically,
legal philosophers adopt a set of principles which might be described as "syllogistic" or "Aristotelian." These rules require that
the philosopher first describe a set of basic axioms-premiseswhich are to be taken as givens in his system of thought. From
these established premises, the philosopher is to apply the rules of
deductive logic to generate other guidelines-conclusions. The validity of a particular approach is determined by the extent to which
the philosopher has followed the logical rules in generating his conclusions from his premises.
Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 933,969-70 (1984). For contrary views, see J. ELY, supra note I, at 118-19; Van Alstyne,
The Fourteenth Amendment. The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33.
34. Dworkin, supra note 17, at 474.
35. See. e.g., Richards, supra note 15, at 506 (defenses of original ism rest on "bad"
philosophy); Simon, supra note 7.

54

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 4:43

One can of course reject entirely the theory that the rules of
syllogistic philosophical argument should govern one's view of various approaches to constitutional analysis. But even if one accepts
the basic theory, its utility as an analytic tool is limited. For by its
nature Aristotelian logic can only be applied to deductions from basic premises. If the premises themselves are based on assertions regarding the nature of observable phenomena, the assertions can be
checked against the actual state of the real world. The axioms of
originalism, however, are based instead on fundamental notions regarding the nature of justice. One can of course disagree with such
premises; but one cannot use logic to prove them wrong.
To illustrate this point in a limited context, assume that the
members of two different religious groups are arguing over an issue
of constitutional law. Members of each group believe as a matter of
faith that a particular book contains the revealed word of God and
that the contents of that book should guide judges in constitutional
cases. They differ in the identity of the book which they consider
authoritative. One group- the Traditional Men's Church
(TMC)-believes in the Book of Falwell, which states clearly that
women are to remain subordinate both in the home and in society
generally. The other group-the Women's Progressive Temple
(WPT)-adheres to the Book of Smeal, which insists on sexual
equality.
Obviously, on sex discrimination issues the TMC members
would advocate a different judicial posture than would members of
WPT. But neither group could be accused of taking illogical positions in the formal sense. Each would simply be following its respective basic premises in an entirely consistent manner.
Like the respective teachings of the Books of Falwell and
Smeal, originalist theory defines its own internal logic. The theory
establishes a hierarchy of premises which judges are expected to follow in order to reach decisions in constitutional cases. Each of
these premises (as well as their respective places in the hierarchy)
reflects a value judgment rather than a deduction from other premises. It is this set of value judgments which forms the body of the
originalist approach. One can disagree with the approach; but since
its elements are not derived from other premises, originalism cannot
effectively be refuted by a charge of logical inconsistency.
If the premises of originalism were foreign to the fundamental
political conceptions of American society one might well argue that
originalist theory could be summarily dismissed. One can of course
adopt whatever premises he chooses, but some are sufficiently farfetched that they can be safely ignored. Professor Mark Tushnet's
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suggestion that courts decide cases in the fashion best calculated to
advance socialism may well fit this description. The basic underpinnings of originalism, however, hardly fall into this category.
Originalism embodies two basic, related ideas on the appropriate structure of the governing process. First, the theory rests on the
mundane observation that even in constitutional litigation the
power of judges derives from the fact that they are sitting as judges
in courts. Typically, this power is viewed as bounded by a variety
of legal conventions, some of which (such as respect for precedent)
are often articulated, but many of which are so basic that they generally remain unstated. Originalists claim quite simply that analogous conventions should be applicable in the constitutional context.
The second observation on which originalist theory rests is that
in constitutional cases judges are relying on a written source of authority-a constitution. For this reason, say the originalists, judges
should adopt legal conventions analogous to those which govern the
interpretation of other authoritative documents such as contracts
and (especially) statutes. It is these conventions which are embodied in the common use of the intent term.
These basic concepts reflect values which are widely shared in
American society. One can of course disagree with these values or
argue that in some circumstances they should be subordinated to
other concerns. But disagreement does not demonstrate that the
originalist mode of analysis is untenable; only that-like every other
constitutional theory-it is controversial and likely to remain so.
A nonoriginalist might still claim to have proved his point by
noting that while he is unable to totally discredit originalism, any
defense of originalism is likely to be equally inconclusive. The nonoriginalist would argue that in the absence of such a conclusive
defense, a judge should not adopt a mode of analysis which prevents
her from reaching results which she believes to be desirable.
Here the issue turns on the burden of persuasion. The
nonoriginalist would focus on the fact that restrictions placed on
the judiciary by originalism force judges to eschew decisions they
would otherwise desire. Surely, she would argue, such restrictions
require cogent justification. By contrast, the originalist would note
that he is simply asking that judges remain within their normal role.
He would contend that the person asking judges to step outside that
role-the nonoriginalist-should bear the burden of demonstrating
the clear superiority of her argument. Neither contention is facially
absurd; one's view of the proper resolution of the burden of proof
dispute is likely to track closely his view of originalism generally.
Thus, a nonoriginalist relying on this argument would demonstrate
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only that a rejection of originalism is plausible. He would not have
proven the claim that reliance on the intention of the framers is
totally insupportable.
Of course, the failure of the absolute arguments to conclusively
discredit originalism does not prove that it is preferable to other
modes of constitutional analysis. The failure does, however, have
important implications for the terms of the debate. For if the discussion must be in comparative terms, then almost inevitably political arguments will predominate-arguments which must consider
not only specific results, but also the appropriate structure of government generally. And on the latter issue, originalists necessarily
start with a built-in advantage. For the originalist position embodies more widely-held views of the appropriate function of judges
generally in a well-ordered society.

